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Abstract: 
The rapid rate of change in information technology compounds with commercial 
pressures in a way that requires information systems to be implemented quickly and 
effectively. This can be critically important to the competitive advantage of a business 
enterprise. 
effort has 
Productivity in system development is not enough, however. Development 
to be well directed and at first sight the new ideas for strategic analysis of 
information systems are very attractive. 
By drawing UpOn a real case study where strategic analysis techniques were used it is 
possible to show that strategic analysis requires its own discipline if it is to succeed, and 
that it will lead to new pressures on the system development process. The mixing of 
bespoke, packaged and reusable system components from different sources will become 
an important factor in implementation, and what we know as system development will 
become more a process of system construction. If this is to be possible a new “open” 
approach to the whole process will be required. 
There is a new international standards initiative which should make an important 
contribution to this problem. Where the OS1 reference model provided a framework for 
open system interconnection, it is hoped that a new reference model for system 
development will provide a framework for open system construction (OS0 
Introduction 
These are difficult times for those who are concerned with information system 
development. Skills are short and application backlogs are growing. The situation in 
any enterprise that is dependent upon computers is likely to be worrying. There will be 
several different existing computer systems which support the routine operations of$the 
business and which are based upon a great deal of existing software. Much of the 
software will have been written some time ago and it may or may not have been 
documented - it is probably not now understood by anyone in any detail. 
Organisations are under pressure to become more efficient, and (in the commercial case) 
to become more competitive and more attuned to the needs of its customers. Senior 
management will be more aware of the potential of information systems to make a 
contribution to the business strategy, and the mystique which has previously allowed the 
data processing department to direct its own future is no longer acceptable. 
In these circumstances DP management has to develop a strategy for survival. Bringing 
in new systems is becoming more difficult and the newer technologies such as fourth 
generation languages and relational databases introduce as many problems as they solve, 
it sometimes seems. It is probable that some parts of new systems will be best satisfied 
using a package where others may be already satsified in large part by existing 
applications software. Yet other parts of new systems that are closely aligned to the 
company’s competitive strategy are likely to have to be specially written: these systems 
must be “better” than those used by the competition. Overall, in order to meet the 
corporate need in the best way it will probably be necessary to integrate of a mixture of 
packaged, existing and bespoke software. 
Even if we are able to develop strategies for information systems which help US to 
identify these parts, the tactical and logistical problems remain. The tasks within the 
total development activity (and the people who achieve them) must all be incorporated in 
an overall plan. The bespoke software may provided by one software house and 
packages come from others. Consultants may be brought in to a&++ in iho &&e3S 
analysis and requirement definition. Regulatory bodies might be involved, and there 
may have to be new equipment and other supporting services to be bought. 
Because of the complexity of bringing all these disparate parts and participants together, 
the existing installation standards will surely prove woefully inadequate. The partners 
involved - the in-house DP staff, equipment suppliers, software suppliers, software 
houses, consultants, users, regulatory bodies - are certain to have dramatically different 
views of the nature of standards and their relevance. Some will have methodologies and 
some 4GLs. Some will talk of quality control and some of configuration management, 
Some will have workbenches and some may talk of IPSEs. Some partners will not be 
understood and others will not understand. All in all we are faced with a nightmare of 
difficulty and potential disaster. 
We need to find a defence against the technical and commercial turbulence that 
surrounds us. If we stand back from the problems and reflect upon them from a proper 
perspective we might come up with a “wish list” of those things that we would like to 
help us straighten out our affairs: 
0 a more productive way of implementing systems; 
0 a proper strategy for sorting out .&d prioritising the backlog of systems 
development; 
0 better ways of integrating new and old systems, and of avoiding doing our jobs 
twice over; 
0 better ways of matching our requirements to the capability of packages. 
Productivity 
The simple view has always been that if productivity is improved most of our problems 
will go away. This argument does not stand close inspection however, and it raises more 
questions than it answers. 
Programmer productivity: 
Increased programmer productivity is an attractive -target and can be approached in a 
strictly clinical and quantitative way - “#4.50 per line of corrected code” . . . “2000-3000 
lines of working code per programmer year”. Programmer productivity can indeed be 
improved but with only limited overall benefit. Whether it helps to reduce the 
applications backlog is questionable, and if we are to measure overall productivity we 
must adopt a much broader perspective. For example: what about the re-programming 
that derives from misunderstandings at the analysis stage? What about the optimisation 
that has to be done because the system is not fast enough? What of the code that is 
written three or four times over because nobody stopped to identify and separately 
specify the common modules? Is this all included in our concept of productive code? If 
so, what proportion is it of the whole? 
Detailed analysis of the number of source lines written and their ultimate disposition 
confirms our worst fears. One analysis of source lines written in large projects [You11 
19841 showed an alarming degree of wastage: 
paid for but not delivered: 28% 
delivered but not used: 48% 
used and abandoned: 19% 
used with changes: 3% 
used as delivered: 2% 
If these figures are representative it is clear that saving a small proportion of 
programming time is nothing compared with getting the specification right in the first 
instance. The figures are a reflection of the rule that one hour of lost analysis time can 
cost many hours of design and programming time. Most of us today retain some interest 
in programmer productivity, but are equally interested in the quality an productivity of 
the analysis and design work that precedes programming. 
Analysis and design productivity: 
Against the background of wasted programming effort it is true that systems analysis 
and design techniques are changing in order to reduce the programming waste. 
Structured methods are being quite widely adopted, but in the majority of cases their 
introduction extends rather than reduces the initial elapsed time in a project. The 
justification for using them is that the time needed for programming will be much less, 
and overall there will still be a saving. It is not yet clear whether the overall effect is 
actually beneficial in the majority of cases, and in some notable cases there are clearly 
problems [Collins 19871. 
Because of the intensity of effort involved in the use of structured methods the 
productivity of the “structured analyst” has become a primary issue. It has become clear 
that machine-based aids for the analyst are helpful and the analyst/designer workbench 
has emerged. There are high hopes for the productivity of these workbenches but there 
are no clear patterns yet. One early (but detailed) analysis [Bytheway 19841 was based 
on experience with a prototype workbench. It mapped the capability of workbenches 
onto well- defined tasks within the overall development cycle (and ancilliary activities) 
and produced the following estimate of the percentage saving in different tasks: 
Feasibility 
Analysis 
Design 
Implementation 
Documentation 
Training 
Auditing (QA) 
Overall weighted average: 
27% 
28% 
24% 
17% 
29% _. 
7% 
13% 
19% 
At the time this provided no more that a target to aim at, but subsequent experience 
with proprietary workbenches is showing that it is m achievable in an easy and 
consistent way. 
And so we find that programmer productivity is only one factor, and that analyst and 
designer productivity may be much more important. As there is wastage in the work 
done by programmers, so we must expect that there will be wastage in the sork done by 
analysts and designers. Perhaps this is avoidable if we get the overall strategy for 
information system development right ? The idea that productivity is a broad issue is not 
new [Gilb 19831 but the current trend to review information systems from a business 
strategy viewpoint is [Wyman 19851. 
The strategic view of productivity: 
To the end-user productivity judgements are based almost entirely upon cost and elapsed 
time, perhaps tempered with some consideration of quality. Given the opportunity to 
inspect the productivity of the system development process himself his criteria would be 
much more concerned with the relevance of each project to the overall business strategy, 
and he would find that it is not always satisfactory. Where there have been such audits 
as this, it has been found that only a minority of the development effort is relevant to 
current business strategy. 
Thus the productivity argument is subsumed into an argument for a proper strategy for 
system development, and for the classification of application systems development 
according to the strategic needs of the business. 
, 
. 
The boundary between business strategy and information systems strategy is a most 
interesting one. Conventional management ideas about markets and products help us to 
take a more appropriate view of the development task. Indeed, the notion that we might 
be able to implement systems in different ways and at a rate that varies according to the 
nature of the system and the attitudes of the user can be formalised very easily. 
A Scheme For The Classification Of Application Systems 
Conventional marketing theory gives us a way of classifying systems. The classification 
of markets or products is usually done according to criteria such as the resource cost and 
the commercial benefits - we can employ these criteria in our domain. 
New markets can be very expensive to operate in. Until the potential is proven there 
will be little impact on the organisation and little revenue benefit - they have to be 
“turned round” first. If they are turned round and there is benefit they have to be 
addressed in a much more disciplined way - they are in effect “strategic” markets that 
have to be integrated into the enterprise, and which will begin to earn significant 
revenues. Once brought under control the strategic market must be serviced in the most 
cost effective way so that the benefit of the revenue-can be maximised. This is usually 
referred to as the “factory” mode, implying high volumes, efficiency of production, and 
(hopefully) high profits. Eventually, the potentional of a market will become exhausted 
and it has to be tolerated only in order to service existing customers and fulfil1 long 
term obligations. 
High resource 
cost 
This can be summarised in a two-by-two matrix: 
Great benefit Low benefit to 
to enterprise enterprise 
F 
New markets with New markets with 
proven potential unproven potential 
“Strategic mode” “Turnround mode” 
Low resource 
cost 
Well established Old markets that 
profitable markets are spent - 
“Factory mode” “Support mode” 
In effect this model is-a life-cycle for markets: they tend to migrate around the matrix 
(in an anti-clockwise direction) as they mature. 
- 
A comparable model has been proposed to assess the strategic impact of information 
systems in an enterprise [McFarlan 19841. The original model can be evolved in a way 
which helps to classify systems very easily: 
High resource 
cost 
High impact Low impact 
on enterprise on enterprise 
t 
New systems with New systems with 
proven benefits unproven benefits 
“Strategic mode” “Turnround mode 
Low resource 
cost 
“Stable, high Old systems that 
usage systems have to be kept 
“Factory mode” “Support mode” , 
0 Turnround systems: 
“Turnround” systems are those which are user-driven, experimental, emerging, 
and probably ill-formed. They will not generally be closely related to existing 
systems, although the time may come when they have to be integrated. 
They will be expensive in the sense that they will tie up expensive resources and 
provide little overall benefit. Their impact upon the organisation is very low, 
and they will have little immediate strategic significance. 
0 Strategic systems: 
Successful turnround systems will be recognised as having significant potential in 
the enterprise. They then become strategically important and have to be brought 
under a degree of control - in effect they become “strategic” systems that will be 
helping the enterprise to move forward. 
They will have to be integrated with existing systems, and (although the cost will 
be high even where they are successfully integrated) they will begin to have a 
significant and beneficial impact on the organisation. 
0 Operational systems: 
Strategic systems which are stable, integrated and well- understood become 
“operational” systems. They have to operate efficiently at high volumes and are 
central to the execution of the business of the enterprise. 
It is here that information systems make their greatest contribution. Their costs 
should be low (or at least well controlled), and the benefits are reflected in the 
primary revenue-earning activities in the enterprise. 
0 Support systems: ‘/ \ ,‘. -... 
--. ..,.,, , _ -- 
Those systems that are supporting spent markets or products, or which are perhaps 
necessary for some reason not connected with the central business objectives (for 
example to satisfy statutory requirements) are “support” systems. 
They have to be maintained, but their contribution to the enterprise is slight. The costs 
ought to be minimised. 
In discussing IS strategy this classification scheme is very helpful indeed. It clarifies 
many problems such as: the way in which the overall development workload can be best 
prioritised, the best balance of resource allocation, the style of project management best 
suited to different projects and the technical strategies that are most likely to achieve 
efficiently the different applications. 
For example an excessively prescriptive style of development (with rigid standards and 
pre-defined milestones and review points) is wholly inappropriate for turn-around 
systems. It would stifle experimentation and prevent the rapid development of new 
ideas which might be critically important to the future - better perhaps to use a 4GL 
without any project controls at all. On the other hand, a lack of discipline in the 
development of high volume systems which have to support central corporate activities 
would be disastrous - these systems must be well integrated and efficient in execution. 
A  Case Study 
But how do these strategic ideas hold up in practice ? Do they lead to a more productive 
implementation of systems? There are few published reports of studies which have 
employed them, although there are signs of activity amongst the consultancy companies 
that operate in these areas [Sweet 19871. 
The case study presented here is not a large one, but it is real and it is interesting. A 
small team of consultants had developed methods for the identification and refinement 
of information system strategies, with help from the Cranfield School of Management. 
The ideas had been applied in a limited sense on other projects, but not in any complete 
way. The opportunity arose to go “live” with a client who had all the right qualifications 
- very real problems, a considerable will to surmount them and great potential for the 
beneficial application of information systems. The study provides a much better 
understanding of the consequences of a strategic approach. 
The company: 
If one believes that there might be a renaissance in British industry, then the company 
in question exemplifies the problems and opportunities involved. It has a recent history 
based upon the manufacture of electromechanical products for the control of process 
plant - mainly eddy current couplings. The manufacture of these analogue devices 
requires a lot of metal working, they take up a lot of space, and they are primitive in 
their actual control capability. They might typically be used to control rotating 
machinery, large fans or other electrically driven equipment. It is clear that digital 
control systems are likely to provide vastly improved control, and other indirect benefits. 
The new product line: 
The microprocessor is widely used in the new products which have been designed to 
replace the old ECCs. The company was able to recruit a team of young engineers and 
designers, having had the benefit of the largest microprocessor application development 
grants ever awarded by the British government. 
There is much more to it all than just the microprocessor, however. The company has 
always sold standard control products, as if from a catalogue. In this position, where 
cost is probably the main buying citerion and where volume production is critical to the 
control of costs and the preservation of margins, any small company is going to be at 
great risk from aggressive competitors. There is much to be gained by a company under 
this kind of threat if it can liberate itself from supplier dependencies and increase 
customer dependencies [Porter 19791. The strategy adopted was centred on a change to 
the supply of systems rather than products, where most of the added value comes from 
engineering design skills rather than the manufacturing process: the customer is much 
more dependent on the supplier of a complete control system than he would be on the 
supplier of components for such a system. Digital control systems can, to a large extent, 
be built from easily stocked components that are amilable from multiple sources. The 
competitive threat is diluted and buyer switching costs can be raised. 
The need for new information systems: 
However, if complete control systems are to be tendered, engineered and commissioned 
quickly and reliably, then the availability of information about the make-up of those 
systems becomes critical. The components are now largely digital rather than analogue, 
and they include software as well as hardware. Information about component 
specifications, re- usability, cost, changes, alternatives, supersessions and sources of 
supply must be easily available to support the sales process, the design process and of 
course the manufacturing process. The total number of components will be much higher 
than with the old analogue products, and there will be a complex hierarchy of 
elementary parts, printed circuit boards, sub-assemblies and completed assemblies in 
each system, instead of just a few drawings. The need to analyse the impact of changes 
will be paramount. Most important, the need to have information available in an 
integrated way, across organisational boundaries and without duplication, quickly 
becomes apparent. The sales effort must succeed in selling something unique and 
complex, that the production facilities can produce without significant special 
engineering. The materials management processes must ensure that the right components 
are available on a timely basis. 
But we are rushing too quickly into the detail of the project as it turned out, which is 
not our main purpose here. The study was an important component in the development 
of the business, because whilst some cash was taken care of by the government grant, 
there is an American. parent company that also has to be convinced. It is a large 
conglomerate that is cash-rich and complementary in terms of product and skills. Despite 
the apparent availability of further cash, nothing comes for nothing, of course. Clear 
plans have to be put on the table describing the further development of new products 
and of the business itself before additional finance will be forthcoming from any source. 
Purpose of the study: 
The purpose of the study was to document the existing systems, to identify the need for 
new or amended systems, and to present strategic system development options on a two- 
year timescale, with some indication of the resourcing and costs involved. This was to 
form a major part of the business plan and provide evidence of the need for investment. 
Gathering the facts: 
The initial part of the study was a classic pattern of fact finding. The four-man senior 
management team was interviewed, and this lead to follow-up interviews with a small 
number of chosen line managers. The findings were reviewed with senior management. 
The process of discovery, where one begins to hear things which initially seem disjoint, 
and which then come together, and ultimately begin to be repeated, indicated that the 
first cycle of fact finding was nearing completion. 
The information systems portfolio: 
The portfolio of computing facilities, in terms of hardware and software, was rather 
haphazard and based more upon historical accident than careful planning. Having said 
that, there seemed to be little computing activity that was unnecessary and a good deal 
that was appropriate. A major element was the use of a bureau facility with which the 
company had once had a strong connection. The connection was no longer, and it was 
worrying to find that the bureau was using a non-standard version of a well-known IBM 
software package for materials management, and that the likely level of support available 
was seriously limited. This bureau facility was clearly a supplier dependency that the 
company could well do without. 
Information processing outside the scope of the bureau service was as much manual as 
computerised, but with increasing use of personal computer software. As many other 
organisations have found, this was both good and bad: PCs liberate the user from the 
shackles of external dependencies, but at the same time they can become exhausting in 
their demands upon the user’s time. Systems developed on PCs tend to duplicate data 
held elsewhere, and in the worst case there is a new kind of dependency upon one’s own 
commitment to the PC. 
In addition to the essentially administrative systems that were found, there was a 
technical software development facility used in product development. This was quite 
specialised and had no immediately apparent connection with the other systems. 
Stated and perceived objectives 
It is necessary to be very clear about the objectives that are expressed by the higher 
levels of an organisation, and the way in which they are perceived lower down in the 
organisation. The popular notion to discriminate between “what must be done” and “how 
it is to be done” is actually a very relative thing - it depends upon the viewpoint (in the 
organisational sense) that is adopted in any particular case. We shall return to this theme 
later. For the current purpose of the exercise, objectives were classed in three ways: 
corporate objectives, business objectives and information systems objectives 
Critical success factors: 
At all points where it seemed appropriate, interviewees were asked for amplification of 
their objectives in the form of critical success factors. There is no purpose in setting 
objectives which are un-measureable or which can not be supported by criteria for 
success. Most importantly, the discussion of CSFs tests the clarity of the interviewee’s 
thinking, their true resolve to achieve what they say, and their general comprehension of 
what they are talking about. It was very interesting and very valuable as a technique. 
Problems: 
No analysis would be credible if it did not incorporate the rag-bag of problems that 
always come out during interviews. Without express provision for the recording of 
problems, many important indicators can be lost which are a valuable part of the 
analysis. 
Analysis: 
In this way the fact finding covered all the basic ground. It was based on a limited 
number of interviews by two consultants, and it produced of the order of 200 
individual, apparently “atomic” notes - each being in effect one or another kind of 
objective, a CSF or a problem. After collation and distillation this produced: 
0 6 essential corporate objectives 
0 8 distinct additional business objectives 
0 14 information system objectives 
0 11 significant problems 
that is, 39 items. The reduction of the raw notes into this refined form was a non- 
trivial process. Even with the assistance of data management software to edit and sort 
the notes it occupied a considerable proportion of the project schedule. 
Let us remind ourselves that we are dealing with a real but small company, and that the 
study was confined to a first pass at the strategic requirement. In another case it might 
be necessary to have many more interviews and the work might be done by a sizeable 
team of analysts. In these circumstances the viability of the strategic analysis process 
could be seriously threatened. The volume of notes can be anticipated, but the time 
needed to deal with them can be surprisingly high. 
This was not the only problem faced. In support of the analysis of objectives and 
problems, the analysis of the business activities and their classification into turnround, 
strategic, operational and support activities was not straightforward. The ideas which 
seem so obvious in the classroom were suddenly inappropriate or inadequate, it seemed. 
The business activities in detail: 
The study identified of the order of 80 functions within the business (see the table 
below). Deciding where to stop in decomposing the activities was of course a problem. 
Decisions were taken not according to likely packages or manageable subsystems, but 
according to the view that was taken by the management interviewed. It represented 
their view of their needs, not the consultants’ views nor the technical opportunity. It 
follows that some headings are natural candidates for a package, some are yet to be 
defined in more detail, and some will probably be grouped together and consolidated 
into a single heading for system development. 
The table shows a selection of the identified functions, and indicates how they were 
being supported at the time of the study and what the agreed classification of them was. 
It can be seen that within a single main functional area there are different kinds of 
system, and that the turnround, strategic, and other classifications follow a pattern but 
are not uniform within a main heading. 
The intention at this point is that the required systems are sorted according to their 
classification, and according to other characteristics that are not included in the table 
above. This provides a basis for determining the policy towards information systems 
development (ISD), and ensures that it is optimally geared to the real business 
requirement rather than to any particular hardware and software opportunities that may 
be perceived, and also independently of the short term pressures that tend to distort a 
less well- considered view. 
Function Current Classlf- 
support ication 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
ADIINISTER CORPANY 
tlanage finances 
handle basic accounts 
prepare management accounts 
contribution analysis 
prepare and nonftor budgets 
Administer corpany 
Bureau 
Hanual 
PC 
Hanual 
Support 
Turnround 
Strategic 
Turnround 
_. 
Hanage personnel 
manage records Hanual Turnround 
provide employee analysis Ranual Turnround 
ad&Met payroll Ranual Support 
manage training programme Hanual Turnround 
recruit new staff Hanual Turnround 
------------------------------------------------------- 
SELL PRODUCTS 
Develop market 
research market 
research corpetitfon 
ilanual 
Hanual 
Strategic 
Strategic 
review sales hfstory anin 
Operational 
Operat fonal 
check stock Bureau Operational 
receive goods Hanual Operational 
inspect materials Hanual Operational 
issue materials (kits) Ranual Operat fonal 
mark completed orders Bureau Operat lonal 
oonitor purchasing Hanual Operat lonal 
Review future needs Hanual Turnround 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
CORPORATE PLANNING 
Provide decision support 
Grant administration 
General enquiry syster 
Ranual 
Ranual 
(none) 
Turnround 
Strategic 
Turnround 
TABLE OF IDENTIFIED BUSINESS FUNCTIONS (Sample only) 
Information systems which support turn-around activity should be rapidly developed in 
a way that leaves them flexible, even if at’ the cost of efficiency (for example with 
4GLs). Perhaps the user can be involved and reduce the demand upon ISD resources. 
Strategic systems are very demanding on management and ISD resources, they create 
unwelcome changes in existing practice, and they create conflicting priorities - there is a 
limit to the amount of strategic development that can be supported and tolerated at one 
moment in time. They will probably have to be bespoke systems, centrally developed. 
Operational systems have to be highly efficient and totally reliable: they might be better 
implemented with packages (if a reliable and efficient package can actually be found . ..) 
or again by bespoke programming. Support systems do not warrant any avoidable 
investment, and packages are to be preferred. 
This is an admirable intention, of course. In practice it is not quite like this. 
The Problem of Granularity 
The objective is to identify appropriate, legitimate and beneficial systems for 
development that will support the corporate strategy. In the study everything had gone 
well: the interviewees had been co-operative, the corporate strategy was perfectly clear 
and almost all of the usual problems were absent. The analysis had produced a list of 
candidate activities requiring supporting systems, but the discipline of the analysis was 
threatened by a number of things: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
The activities are actually elusive and can always be divided into smaller parts. 
A part of one system is shared by another, and one person’s view is rarely 
pitched at the same level as another person’s view. The most appropriate degree 
of detail is not easily identified. 
The volume of data in the analysis had become very high, and the absence of a 
workbench to support the strategic analysis was making it very hard work - even 
though all the notes and information had been loaded into a data management 
package. The granularity of the initial analysis had already produced a large 
,volume of information that was at the limits of the capability of “ad hoc” 
analysis. 
. 
The targets were all.moving, and the closer one looked the more apparent it was. 
Between two interviews the PC systems evolved significantly - for example 
suddenly a link was in place to the USA where there had been none! The 
granularity of the analysis had become so fine that the problem was beginning to 
look like quicksand. 
The appealing idea that a turnround activity becomes (in some orderly way) a 
strategic and then later an operational one is just not that easy. The various 
parts of an activity were found to be in different classifications, and the 
classifications were found to be changing within the timescales of the study. 
They were both relative and interdependent - changing one seemed to affect 
another. 
The whole exercise was at risk of becoming a nightmare. With doubt as to. the i-vel of 
precision required and repeated difficulties in deciding what to decompose mto parts, it 
became clear that a discipline of some kind was needed. 
The concept of granularity, and its use in controlling these kinds of problems is 
important in achieving discipline. The challenge is to manage one’s level of attention in 
the analysis so that it is appropriate in a specific case and yet coherent in the overall 
case. It is the same challenge that is faced by the systems analyst, and which has been 
addressed in the techniques of sti systems analysis. 
Granularity in systems analysis 
It is often argued that the analyst may analyse from the bottom up or from the top 
down; in the former case the lowest level of detail that is appropriate is effectively 
self- defining (the “bottom” is where one starts), but in the latter case there is a problem: 
in using top down decomposition techniques the most difficult things is learning when to 
stop, just as was found in the strategy study. 
The literature refers sometimes to the concept of “what” and “how”. “What” is done is 
that we “receive delivered goods” (say). “How” we do it is: “first look at the label, 
second find the packing note, third find the delivery advice, fourth open the box . ...’ 
and so on. 
_.- 
This is a very relative thing, of course, as we have already noted. One man’s “what” is 
another man’s “how”. The warehouse manager has a “what” that is maintaining the stock 
levels; “how” it is done is by ordering regular deliveries. The computer terminal that 
supports the receipt of delivered goods has a “what” that is looking up the related order 
details; to the goods inwards staff this is just a “how” - a detail within the receiving 
procedure. We need to have better rules to guide us as to the degree of granularity that 
is appropriate in models of systems that are evolving. 
Philosophically this is the same problem as the definition of “real time”. In one context 
it is one thing, in another it is quite different. A guided weapon control system requires 
a granularity of time that deals in microseconds; real time in this case is a timescale that 
discriminates between a few metres or minutes of arc in the trajectory. A mail order 
system requires a granularity of time that deals in days and weeks; real time here is 
anything that can discriminate between delivery in three weeks rather than four weeks, 
perhaps. There are other dimensions to granularity which are concerned with the 
precision with which we specify data, and the increments with which we progress the 
function in a system. 
Rather than refer again to.the what/how distinction, it is more constructive to argue that 
the level of detail must be appropriate to the circumstances, and that decomposition is 
complete when we have derived detail which suits our purpose at any moment in time. 
For example, when the detail distinguishes between the existing system and the proposed 
system, during the earlier stages of analysis; or when the detail distinguishes between 
clerical and computer processes at a later stage; or in a strategic study when the detail 
distinguishes the managing director’s view from the financial director’s, 
In any non-trivial analysis there can be considerable difficulty in dealing with this 
problem. If the work done by one analyst (who was tasked with one subsystem) is to be 
reconciled with the work done by another analyst (who did another subsystem) how are 
we to discover whether they are working at the same level? If they are not, how are we 
to harmonise the products of their analysis so that they become coherent? Can a 
workbench help us here? Or do we have to wait for a more refined and complete 
methodology which is not yet available ? None of these. It is the same problem that the 
strategy study faced, and the missing ingredient is the concept of time. Consideration of 
timing can focus our attention very effectively on the proper level of granularity that is 
required. The following rules express the central idea: 
0 Any activity which at a particular level of abstraction is seen as independent in 
time from other activities can be considered as an independent task for the 
purposes of analysis at that level of abstraction. 
0 At a higher level of abstraction (perhaps as seen by senior management) it is 
allowable to combine a group of related processes into a single process, making 
this process appear independent in time at this higher level of abstraction. At a 
lower level of abstiaction it is possible to divide a process into a set of related 
processes which are each represented individually, provided that they are time- 
independent at this lower level of abstraction. 
0 Any operation within a system which (at a certain level of abstraction) must be 
immediately preceded by or succeeded by a related operation has to be a part of 
a process, and can not be a process in its own right. Instead, it must be regarded 
as a step within the lowest level of truly independent processes above it. 
The question of what we mean by “immediately preceded by or succeeded by” is an 
important one, and directly reflects the concept of real time. We mean that the 
operations are connected in time, on a timescale that is appropriate to the level of 
abstraction employed. For a warehouse operative the appropriate timescale is seconds 
and minutes, so that getting onto a fork lift truck and pressing the accelerator becomes a 
part of the same process. Receiving goods and recording their details do not necessarily 
have to be done in the same day, and they can be considered as separate processes. 
The problem solved: 
By employing this concept, and by supporting the analysis with data flow diagrams 
which were levelled in this way, the strategic study was able to proceed, and to conclude 
its analysis in an orderly way. The results were acceptable because they were coherent, 
and it was possible to adjust the level of abstraction to suit the person with whom one 
was speaking. 
It is important not to confuse what was done with conventional structured systems 
analysis however, because it was not directed at the same aim. The technique was the 
same (top- down decomposition) and the tool was the same (the data flow diagram) but 
the problem that was solved was really quite different to the typical systems analysis 
problem. 
It seems likely then that the strategic analysis of information systems will not necessarily 
be straightforward, and that a clear discipline will be required. The granularity of any 
strategic analysis will tend to fall below the sub- system level, and the assembly of the 
resulting system development tasks into sensible work packages for project teams will be 
a major challenge. 
It will always be possible to compromise by implementing the whole of a sub-system 
using a single package, or by bespoking a complete solution where the effort of 
incorporating existing parts seems too great. And yet systems are becoming larger, and 
the penalties for not mixing and matching bespoke, packaged and existing systems will 
become far greater too. 
Strategic analysis will require a much more flexible approach to system development. 
This will be reflected in a need to deal with t,he parts of systems differently, to acquire 
them from different sources, and in many cases to reuse parts of the system that today 
would be discarded. 
Reuse of Software and Other System Components 
Perhaps the the reuse of software and other system components will be the most 
important technique for development in achieving overall productivity. Avoiding doing 
twice what we need do only once is clearly a problem. Reuse is not a new idea, but 
there are many indications that it might at last become a viable option: 
0 Methods for specifying the user requirement are much more rigorous and 
distinguish between the problem and the technical solution. A problem that is 
defined independently of the solution can be re-implemented in different 
contexts. 
0 Likewise, technical specifications are more rigorous and are likely to be 
supported by workbenches. Specifications that are on workbenches are eminently 
reusable, given a degree of standardisation between workbenches. 
0 4GLs have not been universally successful, but they do provide a fast way of 
amending a system which almost matches the requirement, and they often 
separate the specification of function from the specification of data. Thus 
function and data become independently reusable. 
0 The disciplines which allow us to manage the multiple use of system components 
and to relate them to their associated documentation and changes (particularly 
configuration management) are becoming better understood. 
An enterprise that embarks upon reuse will have to address a number of different 
technical issues, including deciding what are the prerequisites for reusability in 
components and what methods and techniques will support reuse. Prerequisites for 
reusability in components: 
There is sometimes a mistaken view that reuse is applicable only to program code. All 
of the components of a system are potentially reusable, including parts of the initial 
business requirements specification, system specifications, program specifications, data 
structure specifications, source code modules and test plans. It is well known that there 
is a hierarchy of objects which make up any system; there are a number of detailed 
models in the literature which attempt to describe these objects and their relationships, 
but no universal agreement as to their details. Consideration must be given to the level 
of abstraction in systems specifications, the degree of granularity in models of the 
objects in systems, and the precision and degree of formality in the specification 
process. The use of specific methodologies may facilitate or deny reuse. 
The reusability of any particular component of a system will be affected by a number of 
characteristics: 
0 its level in the component hierarchy, 
0 its functionality, 
0 its external interfacing requirements, 
0 its environmental requirements, and 
0 the manner of its documentation or other description. 
Methods and techniques for reuse: 
Knowing what is required before components can be reused is one step, but only the 
first. In actuaIly achieving reuse, there are severa criticalIy important matters to be 
dealt with. 
Systems which are in part reusable, or which employ reusable components, may have to 
be represented in a special way in order that they are properly identifiable. The greatest 
single reason for difficulty in achieving reuse is the problem of identifying and 
recovering components. Although there has been some progress in the representation of 
systems using formal and semi-formal methods, it is not yet clear whether the available 
techniques are sufficient. Reusable components have to be conceived,. specified and 
constructed. Creating reusable components may include significantly different tasks 
from those with which we are familiar. 
The corporate view: 
As well as the technical analysis of reuse, there must be some consideration of the non- 
technical issues. Reuse is not just a technical matter, it is important at the strategic 
levels of information system management. Reuse will be appropriate only in certain 
areas and not in others - it is most likely to be of benefit in the strategic and 
operational quadrants of our model. 
Another non-technical issue is that of ownership where different parties are involved. It 
will be very important to both sides - the supplier organisations and user organisations - 
to understand who retains how much ownership of which parts of a system. 
Open System Construction i The Need for a Universal Model 
This discussion has encompassed many facets of system development. Starting with the 
turbulent times in which we live where information systems can be the deciding factor 
in the success of an enterprise, and by looking for areas of improved productivity, we 
have identified that strategic planning in information systems development is a pre- 
requisite if we are to avoid wastage, and that in each of the disciplines of development 
there are interesting ways of addressing the productivity issue. Further, a careful 
strategy for system development is going to make new demands upon our development 
staff because the optimal solutions are likely to require a mixture of bespoke, packaged 
and reused system components. 
The sources of these components are unlikely to be all within our own control. The 
degree to which we depend upon third- party suppliers of software will increase, and 
there may also be an increasing need to co-operate with other computer users as the 
trend towards integrated systems spills over the corporate boundary into the outside 
world. 
At the start of the paper a wish-list of desirable things was proposed: 
0 a more productive way of implementing systems; 
0 a proper strategy for sorting out and prioritising the backlog of systems 
development; 
0 better ways of integrating new and old systems, and of avoiding doing our jobs 
twice over; 
0 better ways of matching our requirements to the capability of packages. 
If we are to realise these wishes we will have to recognise the need to standardise. In 
the final analysis it is the interfaces between co-operating partners that have to be 
agreed. We need to distinguish between what is done and what is produced. We must 
agree the activities within development and the nature of the deliverables that they are 
expected to produce. What is needed is a framework for system development which 
does not require or presume that people will conf&rm at a detailed level, but which 
provides reference points around which partners in system development can discuss 
specific activities and deliverables within their own context. In this way the 
programmers will avoid doing things several times over, designers can take maximum 
advantage of existing system components, and analysts can specify requirements in a way 
that will not preclude any source of systems: bespoke, reused, or packaged. 
In the ideal case, a proper framework would ease many problems: 
0 Those responsible for procurement could avoid the tortuous business of defining 
from first principles what it is that is being procured. 
0 Those offering products and services could identify them properly, and place 
them accurately relative to others. 
0 Those overseeing development (project management, quality inspectors and 
accountants) could do their audits, calculations, tabulations and analyses using 
criteria and metrics which will render the results comparable from one project to 
another, and perhaps even from one organisation to another. 
0 Those undertaking development could minimise the confusion that arises between 
the different functions and job titles (indeed job descriptions could be written 
unambiguously and optimally). 
0 Those who train our new DP specialists could provide a balanced syllabus that 
recognises actual practice, retains flexibility in newly formed attitudes and fully 
supports the rapid rate of development currently to be seen in the technolony of 
system development. 
In effect we would m m the process of whereby we construct information systems, 
and make it much more fluid. There would be more options, and more points at which 
options are available. Mixing and matching system software components from different 
sources will benefit the user in the same way that mixing and matching hardware does. 
At the spring 1986 conference on Software Engineering tools at Lancaster University the 
closing words included a heart-felt plea for standards. The ACARD report on software 
as a key to UK competitiveness devoted a whole appendix to the question of standards, 
and offered stability, mixed software supply and quality as primary targets for the 
standards effort. There are even new pressure groups forming. The IT Users Standards 
Association (ITUSA) has spawned the Users Standard Forum for IT (USFIT), which is 
gearing up to inject new effort and purpose into the standards making process. But 
standards themselves are not the total answer, because the standards themselves must be 
coherent and well conceived. We come back to the need for a framework. 
There is a new international effort to develop the required framework for standards. 
The idea is to prepare a reference model. This will not itself be a standard, but it will 
enable the production of coherent and well-constructed standards in those areas that 
need them. It is comparable to the development of the OS1 (Open System 
Interconnection) reference model for communications standards. It is intended that the 
reference model for software development will, if it is developed, properly reflect 
current practice and problems. It will provide a means to evaluate existing standards as 
well as the need for new standards - these new standards will therefore be purposeful, 
effective, and well co-ordinated. Z 
The OS1 model was for Open System Interconnection. The proposed new software 
development reference model is aimed at Open System Construction. This is a worthy 
ambition, surely. Time will tell us whether it is achievable. 
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